Game Theory (Mit Press)

著者 : DrewFudenberg JeanTirole

• The MIT Press (1991年8月29日発売)

作品紹介・あらすじ

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics at MIT.

感想・レビュー・書評

[Dr.Iさんの感想 · 2010年9月22日]

Ⅰ　Static Games of Complete Information
　１　Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
　２　Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium
Ⅱ　Dynamic Games of Complete Information
　３　Extensive-Form Games
　４　Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
　５　Repeated Game
Ⅲ　Static Games of Incomplete Information
　６　Bayesian Games of Incomplete Information
　７　Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
Ⅳ　Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
　８　Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection
　９　Reputation Effects
　１０　Sequential Bargaining under incomplete Information
Ⅴ　Advanced Topics
　１１　More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
　１２　Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
　１３　Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
　１４　Common Knowledge and Games

[黄昏さんの感想 · 2010年6月12日]

完全マルコフ均衡や共有知識の発展等、興味を引く話題が多数取り扱われているが、いかんせん難しすぎて全く理解できない。

結構何度も読み返しているが、何度読んでもしっくりと理解できない。

むずい。

[hesukeさんの感想 · 2009年1月18日]

658.01/F95 I