Dr.Iさんの感想・レビュー

Game Theory (Mit Press)

DrewFudenberg JeanTirole

• The MIT Press (1991年8月29日発売)

Ⅰ　Static Games of Complete Information
　１　Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
　２　Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium
Ⅱ　Dynamic Games of Complete Information
　３　Extensive-Form Games
　４　Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
　５　Repeated Game
Ⅲ　Static Games of Incomplete Information
　６　Bayesian Games of Incomplete Information
　７　Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
Ⅳ　Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
　８　Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection
　９　Reputation Effects
　１０　Sequential Bargaining under incomplete Information
Ⅴ　Advanced Topics
　１１　More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
　１２　Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
　１３　Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
　１４　Common Knowledge and Games

感想投稿日 : 2010年9月22日

本棚登録日 : 2010年9月22日